Cognitive hierarchy theory and two-person games by Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos et al.
Cognitive hierarchy theory and two-person games
Carlos Gracia-La´zaro 1, Luis M. Florı´a 1,2 and Yamir Moreno 1,3,4
1Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009, Spain
2Department of Condensed Matter Physics, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009, Spain
3Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009, Spain
4Complex Networks and Systems Lagrange Lab, Institute for Scientific Interchange, Turin, Italy
(Dated: October 5, 2018)
The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly deter-
mined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive Hierarchy Theory
provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain
types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian Beauty Contests and Entry Games. Here, we focus on
symmetric two-players-two-actions games and establish an algorithm to find the players’ strategies according
to the Cognitive Hierarchy Approach. We show that the Snowdrift Game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose
complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third
cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: i) any snow-
drift game can be characterized by only a parameter – its class, ii) they are anti-symmetric with respect to the
diagonal of the pay-off’s space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures
the main features of the Cognitive Hierarchy Theory.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Many real-life situations in human societies imply interactions in which the results of one person’s choices depend not only
on his own behavior but also on the choices of the other individuals involved. In these situations, it is usually assumed that
people behave strategically, taking into account the likely responses of the other participants who might have an impact on their
own benefit. Most theories of behavior assume rationality; perfect rationality is based on two assumptions, namely that agents
form correct beliefs about other agents’ behavior and that they choose those actions that maximize their own utility functions.
Otherwise, when the rationality of agents is limited by practical elements such as cognitive and time limitations or the tractability
of the decision problem, it is said that there is bounded rationality. Bounded rationality does not involve a maximization of the
outcome, since agents can make wrong assumptions about the behavior of others. Indeed, the level of accuracy in the predictions
on the other agents’ actions plays a key role in some situations such as stock-market transactions. These kinds of situations
in which agents’ outcome is strongly determined by their predictions are captured in the Keynesian Beauty Contests [1] and
Entry Games. In the p-Beauty Contest Game [2], participants have to simultaneously pick a number between 0 and 100. The
winner of the game is the person(s) whose chosen number is closest to p times the average of all selections, where 0 < p < 1,
typically p = 2/3, 1/2. Entry games are anti-coordination games in which agents have to decide whether or not to incur a cost
to enter a market [3–7]. The entrants’ profits will be positive if the other agents do not enter, but otherwise can turn out to be
negative. In these games, when players act overconfidently, that is, assuming that the other players do not act with such refined
reasoning as they do, the players are not in equilibrium. Cognitive Hierarchy theories capture this behavior by classifying the
players according to their degree of reasoning in forming expectations of others [8–14]. These theories are characterized by a
distribution of the number of iterated reasoning steps that players can do, i.e., the distribution of players’ levels. While zero-step
(level-0) players just play at random, higher level players assume they are playing against players who do fewer reasoning steps
than they do. The game can be solved by knowing the distribution of players’ levels and the assumptions of players about the
distribution of their opponents’ levels. Camerer et al. found that a Poisson distribution fits experimental data from many different
games [10]. A Poisson distribution is fully characterized by its mean, in this case the average number of reasoning steps, and
they found that an average of 1.5 steps fits many experimental data. This value implies a fast decay: while 81% of players do,
at most, two reasoning steps, only 1% of them do more than four steps , which reflects the limitations of memory and reasoning
ability.
Secondly, socially relevant situations usually involve social dilemmas where individuals profit from selfishness at the expense
of collective welfare [15–17], as well as coordination and anti-coordination quandaries where all parties can maximize their
benefits by making mutually consistent decisions [18–22]. These situations have been widely studied in different disciplines
ranging from economics, sociology, political science to psychology, by using the framework of Game Theory to understand how
people approach conflict and cooperation under modeling conditions [23–26]. In this sense, experimental research has shown
that, when people face these situations in game theory experiments, they do not always exhibit rational behavior, either because
they do not try to optimize their benefit exclusively or because of individual or practical limitations [27, 28].
Here, we focus on a set of two-players-two-actions games that capture two important features of social interaction, namely,
the dilemma between self-interest and the common good and coordination issues [29]. In line with previous literature, we refer
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2to these two actions as cooperation, when the choice transcends self-interest and concentrates on the welfare of collective, or
defection, when it is focused on promoting self-interest. This set of games includes the Stag Hunt (SH) [20], the Snowdrift Game
(SG) [18, 21], and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [29, 30]. SH is a coordination game that describes a conflict between safety
and social cooperation, the greatest benefit for both players is obtained when both choose to cooperate, but against a defector the
best action is to defect, so that cooperation is the most advantageous and risky choice. SG is an anti-coordination game where
the greater individual benefit is obtained by defecting against a cooperator, but players are penalized when both choose to defect,
so that it is always more advantageous to choose the opposite action of your opponent. In PD, a player always get the highest
individual benefit by defecting, while the greater collective benefit is obtained when both cooperate. For completeness, we also
study the harmony game (HG), where the best choice is always to cooperate, regardless of the opponent’s behavior; therefore,
there are no tensions between individual and collective benefits. An arrangement of these four games has been experimentally
studied, finding that players can be classified into four basic personality types: optimistic, pessimistic, trusting and envious,
with only a small fraction of undefined subjects [31]. Although some of these four games, particularly SH, have being solved
according to the Cognitive Hierarchy approach [10], and the solutions for PD and HG are straightforward, SG presents an
intricate pattern of behavior as the cognitive level of the players grows. In this study, we establish an algorithm to solve the SD
case: in addition to analytically solving it up to the third cognitive level, we show some symmetries valid for all levels.
We round off this study by exploring the situation in which players can change their guesses about how cognitive levels are
distributed in the population. Evolutionary Game Theory is concerned with entire populations of agents that can choose actions
according to some strategies in their interactions with other agents [32–34]. We propose a model based on an evolutionary
dynamics, in which the agents of a population interact among them through the above described games. In this iterated model,
the agents do not have any information of the other players, neither regarding their payments nor on their actions, but only one-
step memory of their own payment. According to this dynamics, the players make attempts to modify their assumptions about
the distribution of the cognitive levels of the other players, allowing them to change their assumptions in case their payment
decreases. We numerically solve the model using Monte Carlo simulations, finding patterns of behavior compatible with our
theoretical predictions.
II. RESULTS
A. Preliminary concepts
1. Two-person games
Symmetric two-players-two-actions games can be expressed by means of its payoff matrix, where rows represent focal player’s
actions, columns represent opponent’s actions, and the corresponding matrix element is the payoff received by the focal player:
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
Actions C and D are usually referred to as cooperation and defection respectively. Each player chooses one of the two
available actions, cooperation or defection. A cooperator receives R when playing with a cooperator, and S when playing with a
defector, while a defector earns P when playing with a defector, and T (temptation) against a cooperator. When T > R > P >
S, the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), while if T > R > S > P it is called Snowdrift Game (SG), also Chicken or Hawks
and Doves. Otherwise, if S > P and R > T the game is referred to as Harmony Game (HG), while if R > T > P > S it is
called Stag Hunt Game (SH).
We consider a well mixed population of N agents. According to the payoff matrix (1), a cooperator will receive a payoff
NcR+(N−Nc)S, whereNc is the number of cooperators, while a defector will receiveNcT +(N−1−Nc)P . A given player
will obtain a higher payoff by cooperating than defecting whenever cR+ (1− c)S > cT + (1− c)P , where c is the fraction of
cooperators in the population, excluding himself. That is, there is a threshold Sth for the parameter S:
Sth(T, P,R; c) =
P + c(T − P −R)
1− c , (2)
above which a player will obtain a higher payoff by cooperating than by defecting.
In order to have a two dimensional representation of the parameter space of the four types of game described above, let us fix
the values of the payoff parameters P = 1, R = 2. By varying the values of T and S over the ranges T ∈ [1, 3] and S ∈ [0, 2],
3the plane (T, S) can be divided into four quadrants, each one corresponding to a different type of game: HG (T < 2, S > 1),
SG (T > 2, S > 1), SH (T < 2, S < 1) and PD (T > 2, S < 1). According to these values, equation (2) becomes:
Sth(T ; c) =
1 + c(T − 3)
1− c . (3)
Note that, for fixed T > 2, Sth is an increasing function of c, while it is decreasing for T < 2. This observation will be crucial
in some of the arguments below in next subsections.
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FIG. 1: Two dimensional (S, T ) representation of the symmetric two-players two-actions games for P = 1, R = 2, 0 < S < 2, and
1 < T < 3. (a) Left panel shows the location of the four types of games. (b) Right panel shows (color code shown at right) the average level
of cooperation in the corresponding Nash equilibrium.
2. Cognitive hierarchy theory
According to the cognitive hierarchy theory, each agent i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) is characterized by her cognitive level li (li =
0, 1, 2 . . .) and her assumed distribution of other players’ levels. Level-0 players (li = 0) choose their actions randomly, which
means that a level-0 player should cooperate with probability pc = 1/2, regardless of the values of the payoff matrix. A level-1
player (li = 1) assumes that the other players will act non-strategically (i.e., as level-0 players). In the same way, a level-h
player (h > 1) assumes a heterogeneous population consisted of players of lower levels 0, 1, 2, . . . , h − 1. A strategic agent i
(li > 0) assumes that the cognitive levels of her N − 1 opponents are distributed according to a given distribution (Camerer et
al. [10] considered this to be Poisson). In particular, a level-h player (h > 1) assumes respective ratios gh(k) of level-k players,
k = 0, 1, . . . , h− 1, with
h−1∑
k=0
gh(k) = 1 . (4)
Then, each agent chooses the action that would provide a higher payoff if the cognitive levels of the rest of the agents were
distributed according to her assumption. The next subsection is devoted to the analysis of the actions taken by the agents in the
four types of games under the assumptions of the cognitive hierarchy theory.
B. Analysis
1. Harmony Game
Provided S > P, R > T , the expected payoff is higher for cooperation regardless other players’ actions. In consequence, all
strategic players (level higher than zero) will choose cooperation. In the HG cooperation is the only strict best response to itself
and to defection.
42. Prisoner’s Dilemma
Given the payoff’s ordering T > R > P > S, whatever the value of the cooperation level c is, the expected payoff is higher
for defection, and that is what a strategic player i (li > 0) should choose. In the PD game only the defective action is a strict
best response to itself and to cooperation.
3. Stag Hunt
A player of level 1 assumes a population consisting ofN−1 opponents of level-0, that is, she assumes a fraction of cooperators
c = 1/2. According to equation (3), a level-1 strategist playing a SH should cooperate if and only if:
S > Sth(T ; c = 1/2) =
1 + (1/2)(T − 3)
1− (1/2) = T − 1 . (5)
Now a level-2 player has to consider two situations:
(i) For S > T −1, we have S > Sth(T ; 1/2) and level-1 players will cooperate. Thus, the average cooperation c assumed by
a level-2 player will be c = g2(0)/2 + g2(1) = g2(0)/2 + g2(0) = 1− g2(0)/2. Provided g2(0) < g1(0) = 1, i.e. level-2
players assume at least one level-1 player, we have c > 1/2, and therefore (using that, for T < 2, Sth is a decreasing
function of c) Sth(T ; c) < Sth(T ; 1/2), which implies that a player of level 2 playing a SH will choose to cooperate if
S > T − 1.
(ii) For S < T−1, we have S < Sth(T ; 1/2) and level-1 players will defect. The assumed cooperation level c is c = g2(0)/2.
Provided g2(0) < g1(0) = 1, we have c < 1/2, hence (as T < 2) Sth(T ; c) > Sth(T ; 1/2), and thus a player of level 2
playing a SH will chose to defect if S < T − 1.
Consequently, a level-2 player takes the same action as a level-1 player does: to cooperate if and only if S > T − 1. Let us
assume that level-k players (k = 1, 2, . . . , h− 1) cooperate if and only if S > T − 1. Then, a level-h player will assume
c =
gh(0)
2
+
h−1∑
k=1
gh(k) = 1− gh(0)
2
>
1
2
, (6)
so that she cooperates if and only if S > T − 1, and thus the induction argument allows to conclude that all strategic players
cooperate if and only if S > T − 1 in the SH game.
Summarizing, the line S = T − 1 divides the quadrant SH into two octants: In the upper octant (S > T − 1), all players of
level higher than zero cooperate, while in the lower one (S < T − 1) such players defect. This result is general, for any kind of
normalized distributions gl(k) (k = 0, . . . , l − 1; and l ≥ 1) assumed by the agents, and was already pointed out in [10].
4. Snowdrift Game
A player of level-1 considers that the rest of the players play at random, so that she assumes c = 1/2. In consequence, a
level-1 strategist playing a SG should cooperate if and only if:
S > Sth(T ; c = 1/2) =
1 + (1/2)(T − 3)
1− (1/2) = T − 1 . (7)
Note that this condition coincides with the cooperation condition (5) for level-1 players playing a SH game. However, things
are different for higher level players in the SG, as we now will see. From a technical point of view, the reason is that for the
SG, where T > 2, Sth is an increasing function of c, reflecting a well-known feature of the Hawk-Dove formulation of the SG,
namely that in a population of hawks (doves) it is advantageous to play dove (resp. hawk).
Again, a level-2 player has to consider two situations:
(i) For S > T − 1, we have S > Sth(T ; 1/2) and level-1 players cooperate. Thus, the average cooperation c assumed
by a level-2 player will be c = g2(0)/2 + g2(1) = g2(0)/2 + g2(0) = 1 − g2(0)/2. Provided g2(0) < g1(0) = 1,
i.e. level-2 players assume at least one level-1 player, we have c > 1/2, and therefore Sth(T ; c) > Sth(T ; 1/2), which
implies that a player of level 2 playing a SG will choose to cooperate if S > Sth(T ; c), while she will choose to defect if
T − 1 < S < Sth(T ; c), with c = 1− g2(0)/2.
5(ii) For S < T−1, level-1 players defect. Then, the assumed cooperation level c is c = g2(0)/2. Provided g2(0) < g1(0) = 1,
we have c < 1/2, hence (as T > 2) Sth(T ; c) < Sth(T ; 1/2). Thus a player of level 2 will choose to cooperate if
Sth(T ; c) < S < T − 1, while she will choose to defect if S < Sth(T ; c), with c = g2(0)/2.
Consequently, regarding the action a level-2 player takes, there are four sectors in the SG quadrant (T ∈ [2, 3], S ∈ [1, 2]):
(a) 1 < S < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2), defection.
(b) Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) < S < T − 1, cooperation.
(c) T − 1 < S < Sth(T ; 1− g2(0)/2), defection.
(d) Sth(T ; 1− g2(0)/2) < S < 2, cooperation.
Note that two of the borderlines separating these regions are dependent on the distribution assumed by the level-2 player, i.e.
these regions are non-universal.
At this point, one realizes that regarding the action a level-l takes, there may appear more and more regions in the SG quadrant,
depending on the specific assumption on the distributions gh(k) (k = 0, . . . , h− 1; and l > h ≥ 1). As an illustrative example,
see Appendix A for the possibilities that arise for the actions taken by a level-3 player.
Despite this non-universality and increasing complexity with cognitive levels that characterize the actions taken by players
of the SG, we show in the next sub(sub)section two general symmetries that universally hold, under the assumptions of the
cognitive hierarchy theory.
5. Symmetries in the Snowdrift Game
As before, to simplify notation we will assume the values P = 1 and R = 2, though the arguments below remains valid for
other values compatible with SG.
Given a particular SG game, corresponding to a pair of values (T, S), with T > 2 and S > 1, we will say that it is a game of
class m whenever
m =
S − 1
T − 2 . (8)
In other words, m is simply the slope of the straight line connecting the points (T = 2, S = 1) and (T, S).
The first statement that we will prove is the following:
S1 Any two SG games of the same class m are equivalent, in the sense that any player takes the same action in both games.
To prove this statement, note that Eq. (3) can be rewritten as
Sth(T ; c) =
c
1− cT +
(
1− 2c
1− c
)
, (9)
so that a rational player playing a game of classm cooperates ifm > c/(1−c), and defects ifm < c/(1−c). Here c is the value
of the average cooperation in the population estimated by the rational player under the assumption of a particular distribution of
cognitive levels.
Now, the value of c that a level-1 player estimates is c = 1/2, irrespective of any consideration, so the action she takes is the
same for all games in the same class. Consequently, the estimation of c by a level-2 player is the same in all games of the same
class, so that she takes the same action in all of them, and so on for all cognitive levels, which ends the proof of statement S1.
To avoid possible misunderstandings, let us emphasize that the payoffs received by a player in two equivalent games can be
very different. The notion of equivalence between games means here equality of the actions taken by an agent in both games,
but it doesn’t mean equality of payoffs received.
In what follows, a game m is a game of class m. A second symmetry is the following:
S2 The action that a player takes in the game m is the opposite to the action she takes in the game m−1.
6Level -1 players satisfy trivially the statement S2, for if m > 1, then m−1 < 1. Now, let us assume that for levels 1, . . . , l −
1 the statement holds. Let us call Cl the subset of these levels whose actions in the game m are cooperation, and Dl its
complementary. Then, level-l players estimate
c =
gl(0)
2
+
∑
i∈Cl
gl(i) , (10)
for the game m, while they estimate
c′ =
gl(0)
2
+
∑
i∈Dl
gl(i) = 1− c (11)
for the game m−1, where the last equality follows from the normalization condition on the distribution of cognitive levels.
Consequently, level-l players satisfy statement S2, for if m > c/(1 − c), then m−1 < c′/(1 − c′). Thus the statement S2 is
proved by the induction argument.
C. Dynamics
In this subsection we introduce a very simple dynamics for the temporal evolution of the distribution that each agent assumes
on the cognitive levels of the population, and show results for this dynamics. The assumption is that the only information
available to each agent i at a given instant of time t > 1 is her current payoff, Πti, and her previous payoff, Π
t−1
i . Before
the presentation of the dynamics, we briefly discuss the types of distribution of cognitive levels considered in the simulations
performed.
1. Distributions of cognitive levels
The first type of distribution that we have considered (below referred to as scenario A) is the ”normalized” (truncated) Poisson
distribution employed in reference [10], defined as follows. A Poisson distribution is described by a single parameter τ , which
is the mean and the variance:
fτ (n) =
τne−τ
n!
. (12)
A strategic agent i whose cognitive level is li (> 0) assumes a value of τ = τi, and that the cognitive levels lj (= 0, . . . , li − 1)
of her opponents are distributed according to
gAli,τi(lj) =
fτi(lj)
Ci
, (13)
where fτ is the Poisson distribution (12), and Ci is an appropriate normalization constant, i.e.
Ci =
li−1∑
k=0
fτi(k) . (14)
Writing equation (13) explicitly one has:
gAli,τi(lj) =
τ
lj
i
lj !
∑li−1
k=0
τk
i
k!
. (15)
A second type of cognitive levels distribution (scenario B) uses, instead of a Poisson distribution, the following exponential
law:
7f(n) =
1
2n+1
. (16)
Now, a strategic agent i whose cognitive level is li (> 0) assumes that the cognitive levels lj (= 0, . . . , li − 1) of her opponents
are distributed according to
gBli (lj) =
f(li − lj − 1))
Zi
, Zi =
li−1∑
k=0
f(li − k − 1) , (17)
that is, explicitly:
gBli (lj) =
2lj−li∑li
k=1 2
−k . (18)
The third type of distribution (scenario C) that we consider here is just a normalized uniform distribution:
gCli (lj) =
1
li
(19)
2. Dynamics algorithm
One must first specify the initial condition (t = 0) for the dynamics. In the simulations that we show below our choice is a
population with cognitive levels li (0 ≤ li ≤ lmax) distributed according to a truncated Poisson distribution gAlmax,τ (li) given by
equation (15) where τ = 1.5 and lmax = 20. For the cases in which the distribution of cognitive levels assumed by the agents
is also ”truncated Poisson”, the initial rate parameter τi of an agent i is taken to be τi = 0 if li ≤ 1, and τi = li−12 otherwise.
Then the agents play simultaneously a one-shot game where the action taken by each strategic agent is the best response for
her assumed distribution (either gAli,τi(lj), or g
B
li
(lj), or gCli (lj)) for the cognitive levels of her opponents, each one receiving an
initial payoff Πi(0).
Thereafter, the dynamics proceeds according to the following rules: at each time step t > 0
Step 1 The agents play simultaneously with the action which is the best response according to their current beliefs (random for
level-0 players), each one receiving a payoff Πi(t).
Step 2 Each agent i compares her current and previous payoff. If Πi(t) ≥ Πi(t − 1), the agent i keeps her current belief on the
population distribution, while if Πi(t) < Πi(t− 1), the agent makes an attempt to change her belief.
The attempt to change the currently assumed distribution, for the cases in which this is gBli or g
C
li
(say scenarios B or C)
consists of two mutually exclusive possible events:
• With probability u agent i varies her level li according to li(t+1) = li(t)±1, that is, in an equiprobable way she increases
or decreases its level li at a point.
• Otherwise (i.e., with probability 1− u), she keeps her cognitive level.
For the cases in which the agents assume a truncated Poisson distribution, gAli,τi (scenario A), the trial to change current beliefs
consists of three mutually exclusive possible events:
• With probability u agent i varies her level li according to li(t+1) = li(t)±1, that is, in an equiprobable way she increases
or decreases its level li at a point.
• With probability v (where u + v ≤ 1) agent i varies her assumed rate parameter τi according to τi(t + 1) = τi(t) + ,
where  ∈ [−δ, δ], preserving τi ≥ 0.
• Otherwise (i.e., with probability 1− u− v), nothing changes.
Let us note that the presence of non-strategic (level-0) agents in the initial population is, within this dynamics, a necessary
condition for a proper time evolution. A non-strategic agent chooses her action at random, and thus with probability 1/2 her
action at t = 1 is different from that at t = 0, then making possible that Πi(1) < Πi(0) for some i.
83. Simulations results
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FIG. 2: Simulation of the dynamics of the SG game. The figure shows in color code representation the averaged values of cooperation (left
panels) and cognitive level (right panels) in the stationary state for the initial conditions specified in main text. (a) Upper panels show the
results for the scenario A, where agents assume a truncated Poisson distribution of cognitive levels in the population. (b) Mid panels show the
results for the scenario B, and (c) lower panels show the results for an assumed homogeneous distribution (scenario C). Each point shows the
result averaged over 100 Monte Carlo simulations. Parameter values are N = 103, u = 0.45, and (for the scenario A) δ = 1, and v = 0.45.
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations of the dynamics defined above for the cognitive hierarchy theory of the SG
game, for the three scenarios A, B, and C that correspond, respectively, to the agents’ assumption for the cognitive levels
distribution given by gA (equation (15)), gB (equation (18)), and gC (equation (19)). In all the cases, the initial conditions were
as described in previous subsection, i.e. cognitive levels were initially distributed in the population according to a truncated
Poisson distribution with τ = 1.5 and lmax = 20. The population size is N = 103, the probability of changing the current
9cognitive level (provided payoff decreases) is u = 0.45, and, for the scenario A, δ = 1, and v = 0.45.
In figure 2 we show, for the three scenarios, the averaged value over one hundred simulations (for each (T, S) point) of
the fraction of cooperators and the average cooperative level in the stationary state reached by the dynamics in the whole SG
quadrant (T ∈ [2, 3], S ∈ [1, 2]).
From the inspection of figure 2, a visible result is that the symmetry S1 (equivalence of games in the same class m) is near
preserved by the dynamics. The result is indeed remarkable, in the extent that the preservation of this symmetry requires that
some specific conditions hold, so that the symmetry conservation is non-generic. This is discussed in detail in Appendix B,
where those specific conditions are derived. On the contrary, figure 2 clearly shows the breaking of the symmetry S2 (mirror
anti-symmetry respect to the main diagonal of the SG quadrant), in full agreement with the analysis of this symmetry in Appendix
B, which shows that no specific conditions are needed for the breaking of this symmetry.
Regarding the cooperation level reached for the different scenarios, the differences are also remarkable. In scenario A near full
defection largely dominates below the main diagonal, with a sharp change above it to cooperation values larger than 1/2 which
show an overall tendency to increase with the value m of the equivalence class slope, and near full cooperation as m → ∞.
In contrast, in scenario B, neither full defection nor full cooperation are almost present (except for a few tiny sectors), with
intermediate values of cooperation being largely predominant. For scenario C, a state of full cooperation (c = 1) is reached for
m > 2, while almost fully defective states are only seen for m < 1/2, becoming dominant only as m→ 0.
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FIG. 3: Histograms of the cognitive levels of the population in the stationary state of the dynamics of the SG game in the scenario A. Panels
in the same vertical correspond to games in the same equivalence class m. The values of the game parameters T and S are shown inside the
corresponding panel.
In figure 3 we represent the histograms, for a few selected points of the SG quadrant (T ∈ [2, 3], S ∈ [1, 2]), of the cognitive
levels in the stationary state for the scenario A. Each point (T, S) of a lower panel belongs to the equivalence class of the
correlative upper panel, to show the near preservation of the symmetry S1.
Figures 4 and 5 are as figure 3, but for the scenarios B and C, respectively. The differences between the three figures are
merely of a quantitative nature, as indeed they exhibit the same main qualitative features. This observation points out to the
conclusion that the qualitative aspects of the distribution of cognitive levels in the stationary state of this dynamics is, to a large
extent, rather insensitive respect to the agents’ beliefs. This should undoubtably be ascribed to the very scarce information (own
current and previous payoff) available to agents in this dynamics. On the other hand, this insensitivity is in contrast with the
large differences in the average cooperation reached for the three scenarios, as observed in figure 2. However this is in no way
contradictory: Even for an identical distribution of agents’ cognitive levels in the population, as far as the agents conform their
actions to their beliefs (and not to the real distribution, which they ignore), different scenarios (i.e. different beliefs) produce
different cooperation patterns.
The Poisson-like aspect of the histograms in figures 3, 4 and 5 may suggest that, given that our initial condition for the
cognitive levels distribution is truncated Poisson, the dynamics preserves the type of initial distribution, with perhaps some shift
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FIG. 4: Histograms of the cognitive levels of the population in the stationary state of the dynamics of the SG game in the scenario B. Panels
in the same vertical correspond to games in the same equivalence class m. The values of the game parameters T and S are shown inside the
corresponding panel..
and small deformation. However this conjecture is invalidated by simulations (not shown) performed with other non-Poisson
initial distributions of cognitive levels: even for an initial uniform distribution, unimodal histograms are quickly observed to
emerge from the dynamics.
In scenario A, where the agents believe that the cognitive levels in the population are distributed following a truncated Poisson
distribution, not only the cognitive levels evolve, but also the Poisson parameters τi do. So, how do they evolve? Figure 6 show,
in the leftmost panel, the average 〈τ〉 of the Poisson parameter of the population in the stationary state. A clear correlation of
this quantity with the averaged cooperation level shown in the upper rightmost panel of figure 2 is observed. In the right part
of figure 6 we show, for the same points (T, S) used in previous figures, the histograms of the Poisson parameter values in the
stationary states.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed here the cognitive hierarchy theory for agents playing two-person two-action games in a well-mixed pop-
ulation. While for the HG, PD and SH games the results are straightforward and universal, i.e. independent of the specific
distribution of cognitive levels assumed by the agents, for the SG game the analysis show an increasing complexity with cogni-
tive levels, with results that are non-universal, in the sense that the actions taken by the high cognitive level agents depends on
the specificities of the assumed distribution. Despite this non-universality, we find two exact symmetries: For a given assumed
distribution of cognitive levels, agents of a fixed cognitive level take the same action (symmetry S1) in all the games (T, S)
sharing the value of m = (S − 1)/(T − 2), while they take the opposite action (symmetry S2) in all the games (T ′, S′) with
(S′ − 1)/(T ′ − 2) = m−1.
We introduce a stochastic dynamics where agents can update their current beliefs on the distribution of cognitive levels in the
population, with no available information other than their current and previous payoffs. The simulations of the SG game for
this dynamics converge to stationary states of the population characterized by an average fraction of cooperators which depends
largely on the agents beliefs, but where in contrast, the distribution of cognitive levels reached is rather insensitive to their beliefs.
We provide arguments showing that for synchronous updating, the previous dynamics breaks forcefully the symmetry S2,
while the breaking of the symmetry S1 requires some specific conditions, so that though its preservation is non-generic, nonethe-
less it is not forbidden. Our simulations for different scenarios show the breaking of the symmetry S2, and an apparent conser-
vation of the symmetry S1.
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FIG. 5: Histograms of the cognitive levels of the population in the stationary state of the dynamics of the SG game in the scenario C. Panels
in the same vertical correspond to games in the same equivalence class m. The values of the game parameters T and S are shown inside the
corresponding panel.
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FIG. 6: Dynamics of the SG game in the scenario A. (a) Leftmost panel shows in color code the average 〈τ〉 of the Poisson parameter of the
population in the stationary state. (b) Panels in the right show the histograms of τ for a few selected points, with figures in the same vertical
corresponding to games in the same equivalence class m. The values of the game parameters T and S are shown inside the corresponding
panel.
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Appendix A
As an illustration of the increasing complexity, and non-universality, of the analysis of the actions taken by players of high
cognitive levels in the SG game, we will analyze here the case of level-3 players. Regarding the assumed distribution of cognitive
levels by a level-3 player, the only assumption we make is that g3(0), g3(1), g3(2) < 1, that is, players of level 3 assume that not
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all the other players belong to the same level.
Let us first remind here the results of 2.2.4 concerning the actions of lower level players:
1. Level-1 players cooperate if and only if S > T − 1.
2. Level-2 players take the following actions, depending on the point (T, S) representing the particular SG game:
(a) 1 < S < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2), defection.
(b) Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) < S < T − 1, cooperation.
(c) T − 1 < S < Sth(T ; 1− g2(0)/2), defection.
(d) Sth(T ; 1− g2(0)/2) < S < 2, cooperation.
Due to the existence of the symmetry S2 (see above in 2.2.5), we can restrict consideration to regions (a) and (b), that is, the
octant 1 < S < T − 1.
In region (a) level-1 and level-2 players defect. Hence, level-3 players assume a cooperation level ca = g3(0)/2. Therefore, the
condition for level-3 players to cooperate in this region becomes S > Sth(T ; g3(0)/2), otherwise (i.e., if S < Sth(T ; g3(0)/2))
level-3 players defect. Now, if it is the case that g3(0) < g2(0), then Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) and therefore a level-3
player cooperates in the subregion Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) < S < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2), while she defects in the complementary subregion
1 < S < Sth(T ; g3(0)/2). On the other hand, if g3(0) > g2(0) level-3 players always defect in region (a). Let us refer to the
condition g3(0) < g2(0) as a.1 and to its contrary as a.2.
In region (b) level-1 players defect and level-2 players cooperate, so that the cooperation assumed by level-3 players is
cb = g3(0)/2 + g3(2) = 1 − g3(0)/2 − g3(1). Consequently, a player of level-3 cooperates if and only if S > Sth(T ; 1 −
g3(0)/2 − g3(1)). Now, if it is the case that cb = 1 − g3(0)/2 − g3(1) < g2(0)/2 (condition b.1), a level-3 player always
cooperate in region (b); while if cb = 1 − g3(0)/2 − g3(1) > 1/2 (condition b.2) she always defect in region (b); finally
if none of these conditions hold, namely if g2(0)/2 < cb < 1/2 (condition b.3), a level-3 player defects in the subregion
Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) < S < Sth(T ; cb), but she cooperates in the complementary subregion Sth(T ; cb) < S < T − 1.
TABLE I: The five possible scenarios for the actions taken by level-3 players of the SG game in the octant 1 < S < T − 1. See main text for
explanations on the notation.
Scenario Regions Action
a.1 AND b.1 1 < S < Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) D
Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) < S < T − 1 C
a.1 AND b.2 1 < S < Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) D
Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) < S < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) C
Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) < S < T − 1 D
a.1 AND b.3 1 < S < Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) D
Sth(T ; g3(0)/2) < S < Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) C
Sth(T ; g2(0)/2) < S < Sth(T ; cb) D
Sth(T ; cb) < S < T − 1 C
a.2 AND b.2 1 < S < T − 1 D
a.2 AND b.3 1 < S < Sth(T ; cb) D
Sth(T ; cb) < S < T − 1 C
Summarizing the discussion, there can be a priori up to six different scenarios for the actions taken by level-3 players in the
octant 1 < S < T − 1, that correspond to the six possibilities [a.i AND b.j], (i= 1, 2, j= 1, 2, 3). But one of them, namely [a.2
AND b.1], can never occur for it would imply g3(0) + g3(1) > 1, thus violating the normalization condition on g3. The other
five scenarios are perfectly possible; indeed one can easily construct examples of particular distributions of cognitive levels for
each one of them.
Appendix B
The question addressed in this appendix is whether or not the dynamics introduced above preserves the symmetries S1 and S2
of the cognitive hierarchy theory of the SG game.
The preservation of the symmetry S1 requires that the decision of every agent i at any time t of changing her beliefs be the
same for all the games in the same class m of equivalence, i.e., that the sign of
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∆(S,m) = Πi(t+ 1;S,m)−Πi(t;S,m) , (20)
for fixed m, is independent of S.
Let us first consider an agent whose action at both times, t and t + 1, is cooperation, and let c0 and c1 be the fraction of
cooperators at t and t+ 1, respectively. Thus the payoff difference ∆ is
∆(S,m) = (c1 − c0)(2− S) , (21)
whose sign is then independent of S, provided we restrict consideration to S < 2. Note that without this (somewhat arbitrary)
restriction, symmetry S1 would already be broken for this simple case, whenever δc = c1 − c0 6= 0.
The analysis for the case of an agent whose action at both times, t and t+ 1, is defection is also straightforward. The payoff
difference ∆ is
∆(S,m) = (c1 − c0)(T − 1) = δc(m−1(S − 1) + 1) , (22)
whose sign is then independent of S, for fixed m. In this case, symmetry S1 is always preserved with no need of restriction on
the S (and m) values compatible with the SG game.
Let us now consider the case of an agent that cooperates at time t but defects at time t+ 1. The payoff difference ∆ is now
∆(S,m) = c1(T − 1) + 1− c0(2− S)− S
= δc + (S − 1)(c0(1 +m−1) +m−1δc − 1) . (23)
If δc = 0, then the sign of ∆ is independent of S, for fixed m. Indeed, ∆ is negative if and only if c0 < m/(m+ 1).
However, for δc 6= 0 there is a change of sign in ∆(S,m), for fixed m, at a value of S = Sc(c0, δc,m), given by
Sc(c0, δc,m) = 1 +
δc
1− c0(1 +m−1)−m−1δc , (24)
provided Sc(c0, δc,m) > 1. If this is the case, the symmetry S1 is broken. In fact, it is easy to find particular values of m, c0
and c1 for which this condition holds, even with the (somewhat arbitrary) restriction to values of Sc < 2.
Finally, for an agent that defects at time t but cooperates at time t+ 1, the payoff difference ∆ is
∆(S,m) = c1(2− S) + S − c0(T − 1)− 1
= δc + (S − 1)(1− c0(1 +m−1)− δc) . (25)
As in the previous case, if δc = 0, then the sign of ∆ is independent of S, for fixed m. In this case ∆ is negative if and only if
c0 > m/(m+ 1).
For δ 6= 0 there is a change of sign in ∆(S,m), for fixed m, at a value of S = Sc(c0, δc,m), given by
Sc(c0, δc,m) = 1 +
δ
c0(1 +m−1) + δc − 1 , (26)
provided Sc(c0, δc,m) > 1.
Summarizing, the dynamics introduced above doesn’t preserves generically the symmetry S1 of the SG game. However, if the
updating is asynchronous, where δc = c1−c0 = 0, under the usual restriction of the values of the parameter S < 2, the symmetry
S1 is preserved. It should be emphasized, that when the updating is synchronous, the breaking of the symmetry requires certain
conditions to hold for some agent at some time during the evolution, so that the observation of symmetry preservation is not
forbidden ”a priori”.
To address the preservation of the symmetry S2 we will analyze now the updating of an agent in two SG games whose
representative points in the diagram (S, T ) are mirror images each other respect to the principal diagonal of the SG quadrant. If
we denote by (S,m) one of the games, the other is (S′,m−1), with S′ = m−1(S − 1) + 1.
We assume that at a time instant t, the strategic configurations in both games are S2-symmetric, so that the action taken by
any agent in one of the games is the opposite she takes in the other, and the same occurs at time t + 1. Then if c0 and c1 are,
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respectively, the fraction of cooperators at times t and t+1 for the game (S,m), the values corresponding to the game (S′,m−1)
are c′0 = 1− c0 and c′1 = 1− c1.
Let us first consider an agent that cooperates, at both times t and t+ 1, in game (S,m), so that she defects at t and t+ 1 in the
mirror-symmetric game. The payoff differences are
∆(S,m) = (c1 − c0)(2− S)
∆(S′,m−1) = (c′1 − c′0)(T ′ − 1) = (c0 − c1)S . (27)
Under the usual restriction, S < 2, we see that sign ∆(S,m) = −sign ∆(S′,m−1), so that the updating decisions are opposite,
and the symmetry S2 is broken, whenever δc = c1 − c0 6= 0. Note that if δc = 0, both differences are zero and, in both games,
the agent doesn’t try updating.
Let us now consider the case of an agent that cooperates at time t but defects at time t+ 1 in game (S,m), so that she defects
at t and cooperates at t+ 1 in the mirror-symmetric game. The payoff differences are
∆(S,m) = δc + (S − 1)(c0(1 +m−1) +m−1δc − 1) (28)
∆(S′,m−1) = δ′c + (S
′ − 1)(1− c′0(1 +m)− δ′c) (29)
where we called δ′c = c
′
1 − c′0, and used equation (23) for the first equation, and adapted equation (25) for the last one. To
proceed further, one can use δ′c = −δc, c′0 = 1− c0, c′1 = 1− c1, and S′ = m−1(S − 1) + 1, to obtain
∆(S′,m−1) = ∆(S,m)− δc + c0(1 +m)−m . (30)
Thus, if it is the case that −δc + c0(1 + m) −m > 0 the payoff differences have opposite sign for δc − c0(1 + m) + m <
∆(S,m) < 0, while if−δc+c0(1+m)−m < 0 the payoff differences have opposite sign for 0 < ∆(S,m) < δc−c0(1+m)+m.
Let us first consider the case δc = 0. If c0(m + 1) −m > 0, then ∆(S,m) = (S − 1)(c0(1 + m−1) − 1) > 0 and thus the
payoff differences have the same sign. While if c0(m+ 1)−m < 0, then ∆(S,m) = (S − 1)(c0(1 +m−1)− 1) < 0 and the
payoff differences have also the same sign. Consequently, for δc = 0, the symmetry S2 is preserved.
For the case δc > 0, one can has
• If−δc+c0(1+m)−m > 0, then δc+c0(m+1)−m > 2δc, thus ∆(S,m) > (2T −3)δc > 0, and the payoff differences
have the same sign, and the symmetry S2 is preserved.
• If −δc + c0(1 +m)−m < 0, the symmetry is preserved provided c0(m+ 1)−m < −δc(T − 1)/(T − 2).
For the case δc < 0, one can has
• If−δc+c0(1+m)−m < 0, then δc+c0(m+1)−m < 2δc, thus ∆(S,m) < (2T −3)δc < 0, and the payoff differences
have the same sign, and the symmetry S2 is preserved.
• If −δc + c0(1 +m)−m > 0, the symmetry is preserved provided c0(m+ 1)−m > −δc(T − 1)/(T − 2).
Summarizing, the symmetry S2 is preserved for δc = 0, but it is always broken for δc 6= 0.
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